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Abstract
Although different theories attempt to explain the underlying mechanism of false
remembers, none have been able to adequately describe this process. The current study
aims to determine if a specific contextual detail (i.e., font color) can be tied to false
remembers (i.e., false memory that contains contextual or perceptual details), and if there
are age differences in this ability. Using the Deese, Roediger, McDermott (DRM)
paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) and the contextual detail of font
color, this study investigated if older and younger adults can tie a specific color to studied
items and critical lures (non-presented semantic associates). No differences in the ability
to tie the color back to studied items and critical lures were found between older and
younger adults; however, both groups had performances that were at or near chance. It
was found that older adults used remember responses (i.e., a specific detailed memory)
more frequently than know responses (i.e., a feeling of familiarity). This indicates that
older adults are able to associate specific details, although their performance was as poor
as younger adults in incorporating the specific detail of font color that was supplied.
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Context Effects of False Remember Responses in Older and Younger Adults
It is easy to believe that memory is a reproductive process, recording events
verbatim, much like a video camera does, however research has shown that this notion is
not accurate and that memory is prone to many different types of errors (Bartlett, 1932;
Roediger, 1996; Schacter, 1999). Memory has been shown to be a reconstructive process,
meaning that it can be changed, distorted, or interfered with, depending on one’s current
interpretation of the event (Bartlett; Reyna & Lloyd, 1997). These memory errors also
have been shown to increase with age, as some cognitive processes decline. In particular,
episodic memory seems to be affected by age related cognitive decline (Levine, Svoboda,
Hay, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2002; Mitchell, Brown, & Murphy, 1990). In recent years,
a particular type of memory error, termed false memory, has been a focus of research,
especially in the context of eyewitness testimony (Loftus, 1979). Research has extended
to older adults, who have been shown to have an increased rate of false memory in some
contexts (Schacter, Koustaal, & Norman, 1997; Tun, Rosen, & Blanchard, 1998). A false
memory is the remembrance of an event that never happened, or the remembrance of
details for an event that are inaccurate (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). People who
experience false memory often believe them to be true with the utmost confidence, and
can sometimes recall specific contextual details surrounding the memory. These detailed,
episodic false memories are referred to as phantom recollections (PRs), or more recently,
false remembers, and are different from other types of false memory in that they are more
than just feelings of familiarity (Brainerd, Wright, Reyna, & Mojardin, 2001).
The existence of false memory, and even more specifically false remembers, has
sparked much controversy, especially in regards to eyewitness testimony (Loftus, 1979).
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The nature of false remembers makes them apparently indistinguishable from true
memory, given that both are accompanied by specific, contextual details. This could have
serious implications for the validity of eyewitness testimony, especially from older adults
(Bernstein & Loftus, 2009). There also have been mixed results in attempting to describe
the underlying mechanism of false remembers, as no theory can fully explain why
contextual details could be incorporated into an event that never occurred. The current
study aims to determine not only if the occurrence of false remembers for contextual
details is possible, but also if there are age-related differences in rates of these highly
detailed false memories.
Episodic Versus Semantic Memory
Memory can be defined in many different ways, but perhaps the most simplistic is
as a storage place for facts, knowledge, and life events. Although memory for factual
knowledge has been shown to be fairly stable over time, memory for autobiographic
events is often subject to forgetting or distortion and is not very stable over time
(Tulving, 1985). These unstable and stable types of memory can be broken down into two
different types, episodic and semantic memory. Tulving theorized that there are different
types of memory systems that can be defined by functions (i.e., what they do) and
properties (i.e., how they do it). Episodic memory is a unique process in that it allows us
to remember events from our past (Tulving, 2002). There are differences between
episodic and semantic memory and it is important to distinguish between the two.
Episodic memory is memory for personal experiences, events, or situations, and is
autonoetic, or self-knowing (Tulving, 1985). The memories within this system are
unstable and are often prone to intrusions, distortions, and forgetting. Episodic memory
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allows us to remember past events in our lives through a mental time travel, and is
heavily dependent on the contextual details of each event. For example, remembering the
location of the White House is a semantic memory; remembering that your elementary
school teacher who had blue hair showed you a video about the White House is an
episodic memory. Specific details, such as your teacher’s blue hair, are brought to mind
as you retrieve this autobiographical memory. Episodic memory is unlike any other
memory system in that it is accompanied by a feeling of mental time travel to the past
(Tulving, 2002). Even though episodic and semantic systems are similar in the ability to
retrieve previously experienced information, a major difference between these types of
memories is the reliance on contextual details (Tulving, 2002).
Semantic memory is categorized as memory for factual information, and is a
relatively stable type of memory system. This type of memory has been called “noetic”,
meaning that it is knowing, and that we do not experience semantic memory, we learn it
(Tulving, 1985). An example of a semantic memory is the knowledge that the White
House is in Washington, D.C. A person does not necessarily have to take a vacation to
D.C. in order to know the fact that the White House is in D.C., instead, this can be
learned from many different sources. Unlike episodic memory, contextual details are
irrelevant to semantic memory (Tulving). This means that forgetting that your elementary
school teacher with blue hair taught you that the White House is in D.C. will not interfere
with your semantic memory of this information.
Tulving (1985) designed the remember versus know (RK) paradigm to
differentiate between semantic and episodic memory systems. During his research,
Tulving noticed that people often use the phrase ‘I know…’ when relaying a semantic
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memory (e.g., ‘I know the White House is in D.C.’) and ‘I remember…’ (e.g., ‘I
remember when my teacher with blue haired showed me a video about the White House)
when describing an episodic memory. Although it is not universally accepted that these
responses are proxy for the two memory systems, it is widely used in the field of
cognitive psychology and in the study of memory. Under this paradigm, it is believed that
a remember (R) response would include specific contextual details for an event (i.e.,
episodic memory); in contrast, a know (K) response would lack contextual details,
relying more on a feeling of familiarity akin to a semantic memory (Tulving, 1985). The
RK paradigm has been used in many different areas of psychology to identify
recollection and familiarity (Lampinen, Meier, Arnal, & Leding, 2005; McDermott &
Roediger, 1998). The RK paradigm has also been used to study older adults, as they have
been shown to have age-related decreases in episodic memory (LaVoie & Fogler, 2014;
Naveh-Benjamin, Brav, & Levy, 2007), while semantic memory seems to be protected
(Levin et al., 2002).
Some research in the field of aging shows that, although memories that are
familiarity based do not decline with age, recollection memory does (Yonelinas, 2002).
As previously stated, episodic memory has been shown to decrease with age related
cognitive decline (LaVoie & Fogler, 2014; Naveh-Benjamin, Brav, & Levy, 2007). Both
of these findings directly relate to the study of R versus K responses, and would suggest
that older adults would display an increase of both true and false K responses, but a
decrease in true and false R responses. The idea behind this is that older adults would not
be able to recollect verbatim items that were previously presented, and instead would rely
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on feelings of familiarity based on the gist or semantic relatedness of the items they were
being presented (Yonelinas).
False Memory
False memory has been predominantly studied using the RK paradigm (Roediger
& McDermott, 1995), and also yields differing results in older versus younger adults
(LaVoie & Fogler, 2014; Schacter et al., 1997; Tun et al., 1998). False memory is
described as remembering something that has never happened, or remembering details of
an event differently from what actually occurred (Roediger & McDermott). The false
memory phenomenon has received much attention in the last 10 to 20 years, and has
many implications for real life, such as the reliability of eyewitness testimony. This
robust phenomenon is often seen in real life, and also can be induced in a laboratory
setting (Gallo, Roberts, & Seamon, 1997).
False memory has frequently been studied using the Deese, Roediger, and
McDermott (DRM; Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) Paradigm and RK
responses. The DRM paradigm is a list-learning task consisting of semantically related
word lists and associated critical lures that are never presented. Deese (1959) originally
created this list-learning paradigm in attempts to examine extra-list intrusions, and
Roediger and McDermott (1995) adapted the paradigm to induce false recall and
recognition in participants. The creations of these lists have allowed researchers to induce
false memory in laboratory settings and garner robust findings. An R response for a
critical lure is defined as having specific contextual details for an event (Gallo et al.).
This specific type of false memory, false remembers, incorporates the application of
contextual details to some type of memory trace; however, where and how these details
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become incorporated in the memory is contested among false memory researchers (see
Brainerd & Reyna, 2001; Johnson & Hastroudi, 1993; Yonelinas, 2002). Interestingly
enough, researchers have been unable to find a definitive way to distinguish true from
false memory, especially false remembers (Bernstein & Loftus, 2009). Previously, it was
believed that the crucial difference between these two memory types was that veridical
memory contained rich, contextual details and high confidence ratings; however, false
remembers are accompanied by rich, contextual details and high confidence ratings,
despite the memory being false (Bernstein & Loftus; LaVoie & Fogler, 2014; Roediger &
McDermott).
The ability to create false remembers (i.e., phantom recollections) was found in a
study conducted by Gallo and Roediger (2003). In this study, both older and younger
adults heard or saw DRM lists of varying lengths, in attempts increase associative
activation. The idea of associative activation is that presenting associated words
internally activates a critical lure. It was hypothesized that by increasing the list lengths
and therefore the level of associative activation would increase false remembers rates in
both older and younger adults. It was found that both older and younger adults had
increased levels of false remembers with longer lists, though older adults’ source
judgments for both studied items and critical lures were less likely to match the actual
modality of the related list (Gallo & Roediger). These findings show that false
remembers are possible and occur for both older and younger adults.
Although some theories can explain the occurrence of false K responses (see
Brainerd & Reyna, 2002; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), or feelings of
familiarity, not many can sufficiently explain how or why false remembers occur. Three
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influential theories that are applied to the false memory phenomenon are fuzzy trace
theory, source monitoring theory, and content borrowing theory. Each of these theories
takes a different approach to explaining false memory, but none can adequately explain
the indistinguishable nature of true and false recollection.
Theories Explaining False Memory
Fuzzy trace theory (FTT). Although fuzzy trace theory was not originally
applied to false memory, it has been shown to explain some features of this phenomenon.
Different aspects of FTT can be explained using the RK paradigm. FTT states that there
are two different type of memory traces, gist and verbatim, that are stored together, and
through dissociated retrieval, can lead to memory errors such as false memory (Brainerd
& Reyna, 2002). The first type of memory trace, gist-based, deals with the overall
meaning or theme of an event and is relatively stable over time. A gist-based memory
trace would lead a person to a K response, as specific details are not incorporated into the
gist of a memory. For example, you may remember the overall idea of a presentation but
you will not remember word for word what was said. This leads us to the other type of
memory trace, verbatim traces. A verbatim trace includes the episodic, contextual details
of an event. A verbatim trace would lead to a true R response and decreased occurrence
of false memory, due to the specific remembrance of the words presented on the list and
the ability to recollect to reject a critical lure.
FTT holds that if verbatim trace is strong enough, then it will be retrieved over the
gist trace, causing a decrease in false memory. In this case, participants will recollect to
reject, which is the ability to recollect the previously studied items, and recognize that the
critical lure actually was not presented. In contrast, if the verbatim trace is weak, then the
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gist trace will be favored and familiarity will take over, allowing for false memory to
occur (Reyna & Mills, 2007). This implies that there cannot be specific, contextual
details for false memory, and that the only true response to a critical lure is a K response.
This is not the case though, as it has been shown that people often have false remembers
for items that were never shown (Gallo et al., 1997; Roediger & McDermott, 1995).
Fuzzy trace theorists have accepted that both verbatim and gist traces can have specific
contextual details and that there can be false remembers, though the theory cannot
exhaustively explain why (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002). Instead, they believe that when a
false memory is constructed during testing, there is a possibility that specific details are
simultaneously confabulated (Brainerd & Reyna, 2001).
Source monitoring theory. Source monitoring theory has been applied to false
memory in attempts to understand the underlying mechanism of this phenomenon. This
theory focuses on the judgments about the source, or origin, of information, which can
refer to the context in which the memory is created (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay,
1993). The occurrence of a false memory is described as a source monitoring error, or,
the inability to connect a memory to a direct source. This error may play on feelings of
familiarity, in which it is believed that something familiar was actually previously
presented. Due to the familiarity of the new item, perhaps through semantic relatedness,
the correct source from which it was derived cannot be determined, and it is judged as
being old. An example of this is the judgment that the word sleep was presented because
of its similarities with the words bed and nap, which were shown before. The familiarity
of the word leads to an inability to correctly determine the source of sleep was internally
generated, not externally presented on the word list (Johnson et al.).
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In this theory, it is believed that memories are stored in such a way that episodic
and semantic information overlap, allowing misattributions of sources and perceptual
information to occur (Johnson et al., 1993). Based on this theory, it would make sense to
believe that all false memory are derived from feelings of familiarity, and should be
categorized using a K response. This, however, is not the case; as previously stated,
critical lures are often given R responses. Though Johnson et al. do not deny the
existence of false remembers, their theory cannot adequately explain why or how false
remembers occur, and why they are accompanied by such high confidence ratings.
Another theory, content borrowing, can explain the occurrence of false remembers, but
not all aspects of false memory (Lampinen et al., 2005).
Content borrowing. Content borrowing has often been used to explain why a
false memory can be so vivid and indistinguishable from a true memory. The idea behind
content borrowing is that when something that has never been presented before seems
familiar, people will unknowingly search their episodic memory for details from a related
true memory and errantly borrow these details in attempts to corroborate the false
memory (Lampinen et al., 2005). The process of mentally searching and borrowing
details is thought to be a long process, which would lead one to believe that it takes
longer to form a false memory compared to a true memory. Studies using reaction times
show that this is actually not the case, as sometimes, R responses for a false memory are
just as fast, if not faster, as those for a true memory (Stretch & Wixted, 1998; Tun et al.,
1998; Williamson et al., 2015). Unfortunately, along with reaction time data, content
borrowing also cannot explain why not all false memory are given R responses. It would
seem that if the details of a true memory are so readily borrowed and bound to a false
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memory, that the result would always be R responses. Although many false memory do
contain episodic details, some are based on feelings of familiarity, and are, in fact, given
K responses.
Despite the inability to fully explain the mechanism behind false memory
creation, researchers still apply the aforementioned theories to study false memory.
Though these theories can explain some aspects of false remembers, they cannot explain
all of the results regarding false remembers. As noted above, reaction times in
responding “old” to critical lures have been shown to be as fast as studied items (Stretch
& Wixted, 1998; Tun et al., 1998; Williamson et al., 2014). A novel approach (Fogler,
2011; Williamson et al.) to explaining false remembers shifts the error to one of encoding
versus retrieval. This approach posits that critical lures are being internally generated at
encoding (as do the aforementioned theories) and are concurrently being bound to
contextual details during that encoding episode (none of the aforementioned theories
posit this process). Due to the nature of this approach, it is assumed that people can
encode and associate contextual details implicitly. Evidence, through reaction time data
and the role of sleep consolidation in false remember rates (Fogler; Williamson et al.),
has supported that this is happening for younger adults, though this has yet to be
examined in older adults. In order to examine the potential role of encoding in false
remembers, one must first establish whether or not older adults can encode and associate
contextual details to semantic information (e.g., gist). Surprisingly perhaps, the answer
to this question is disputed.
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False Memory in Older Adults
Much, though not all, of false memory research has shown that older adults are
more susceptible to false memory than younger adults, though the exact cause of this is
unknown (LaVoie & Fogler, 2014). Age-related declines in cognition and memory could
explain why older adults make more false R and K responses, but the source of this
occurrence has yet to be found. Gutchess et al. (2007) found that older adults have a
tendency to rely on contextual details, and because of this, have trouble rejecting stimuli
that are new, regardless of whether or not they are semantically related to old
information. This would account for increased false memory rates in older adults, and
would also lead one to believe that they would have increased false remembers,
compared to younger adults, but other theorists disagree. As described by NavehBenjamin et al. (2007) and the Associative Deficit Hypothesis, older adults also have
difficulty forming associations and correctly binding associations to the appropriate
content.
Associative Deficit Hypothesis. In the Associative Deficit Hypothesis (ADH), it
is believed that older adults have declines in the ability to create and use associations
between contextual details and contents, meaning that they have difficulty binding
together details or components into solidified units (Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2007). The
ADH is theorized to be the underlying mechanism of age-related episodic memory
impairments. The theory states that older adults have issues with associative memory,
that is, tying together details of an item to the specific item. An example of this would be
the inability to bind together the font color of a list of words with the actual words on the
list. This could explain increased false K responses in older adults, as contextual
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information is not bound directly to an item, causing these details to be applied to similar
items such as a critical lure.
A study using the ADH framework presented both older and younger adults 40
word-nonword pairs on index cards (Naveh-Benjamin, 2000). Participants were presented
with the words in groups of two to three, and were informed that they would need to
study the words for an item and associative recognition test (word recognition, nonword
recognition, and associative recognition). The word recognition test consisted of 20
words, 10 targets and 10 distractors, with the target words being randomly selected from
the previously studied pairs. Participants were asked to circle the word that appeared
during the study phase. The nonword recognition test was structured in the same manner,
but with nonword targets. Finally, the associative recognition test consisted of 20 wordnonword pairs, 10 of which were original pairs from the study phase. The other 10 pairs
were new combinations of previous pairs from the study list. Participants were told that
all words were on the study list, but that only 10 of the pairs were in the correct order,
and were asked to circle these 10 correct pairs. The results showed that younger adults
performed better than older adults overall, and that across participants, performance on
the word test was significantly better than performance on the nonword test. Finally,
older adults were shown to perform significantly worse than younger adults on the
associative recognition and nonword tests, but not differing on the words test. The results
of this experiment show that although older adults were able to encode word information,
as shown by performance on the word test, they had difficulties encoding associative
information, as shown by age differences on the associative recognition test (NavehBenjamin). These results support the idea that episodic memory decline could be
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mediated by the inability to associate the correct context to a particular content. This
research is of particular importance, as it could explain the increased rates of false
memory, specifically false K judgments, displayed by older adults. An opposing theory,
hyper-binding, also attempts to explain age-related differences in RK responses, but
states that older adults are actually over-binding, or over-associating information.
Hyper-binding. In hyper-binding theory, it is believed that a decrease in
inhibitory regulation leads older adults to errantly bind too much information from the
environment, and therefore form excessive associations between irrelevant and relevant
stimuli (Campbell, Hasher, & Thomas, 2010). This decrease in inhibitory regulation is
believed to cause older adults to encode important information, but also to encode
distracting information that has no relevance to the task. In attempts to test this theory,
Campbell and colleagues conducted a study to determine if older adults would form not
only meaningful associations, but also associations between distractors and co-occurring
targets.
In a series of two experiments, Campbell et al. (2010) tested both older and
younger adults on a 1-back task containing pictures superimposed with irrelevant words.
During the 1-back task, participants were told to ignore the words, and press the spacebar
if the current picture was the same as the previous picture. Participants were give a paired
associates memory task, containing preserved and disrupted pairs of the irrelevant words
featured on the 1-back task. The participants were not told that the words shown on the 1back task would be important or featured later on in the experiment. This task consisted
of a study list containing 12 picture-word pairs, and a recall test. During recall,
participants were shown the pictures and asked to remember the words that were
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previously paired with each picture. Though there were no differences in overall recall
rate between older and younger adults, there was a significant interaction between age
and pair-type, such that older adults showed an advantage for preserved pairs and a
disadvantage for remembering disrupted, and younger adults performed similarly across
pair types. The researchers believe that the results of this study support the idea that older
adults are errantly binding too much information, including that of target and distracting
information (Campbell et al.).
The Current Study
Both ADH and hyper-binding could be applied to the age-related differences in
false memory rates, though each theory would predict a different outcome. If the ADH is
correct, older adults should have more K responses, as they cannot accurately bind
contextual information to the correct content, but would still have feelings of familiarity
for the item. If hyper-binding theory is correct, then an increase in R responses, both true
and false, would be expected. In this case, older adults would be errantly binding too
much information, and would be unable to recollect to reject the critical lures, increasing
the amount of R responses for this word type.
The current study aims to test the aforementioned theories of false memory by
investigating 1) the role of a specific contextual detail in the rate false remembers and 2)
any age-related differences in R and K responses. As to the first hypothesis, Lavoie and
Fogler (2014) suggest that by giving older adults a salient context, they will use that
context and have more true and false R responses. Using a method similar to LaVoie and
Fogler, and the encoding hypothesis (Fogler, 2011), it is hypothesized that when
participants give an R response (i.e., a specific, detailed memory of the item) they will be
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more likely to get the font color correct (i.e., the font color of the presented word list)
than when they give a K response, suggesting that this added contextual detail at
encoding bolsters their ability to specifically recollect items. As to the second
hypothesis, if ADH is correct, any specific details would not be associated with the word
lists or corresponding critical lure, and more K versus R responses should be observed for
older adults in comparison to younger adults. If hyper-binding is correct, older adults
should have higher true and false R responses, as compared to younger adults, due to
contextual details being bound to studied items and critical lures. Results will also be
interpreted in light of the general theories of false memory previously described (e.g.,
fuzzy-trace theory, source monitoring theory, and content borrowing).
Method
Participants
The study originally consisted of 27 older adults, and 37 younger adults, but four
older and five younger adults’ data was excluded from the study. Out of the four older
adults that were excluded, one was due to failure of the participant to follow instructions,
and three were due high rates of response bias during testing, as shown through a high
proportion of old responses to filler items (i.e., above 45%). The participant who failed to
follow direction did so by flipping through the pages in attempts to match semantically
related items on response type and color. All older adults participants obtained a score of
27 or higher on the MMSE. Out of the five younger adults excluded, one was due to
failure to follow instructions, and four were due to high rates of response bias. In total,
data from 23 older adults, ages 63-85 years (M = 76.61, SD = 5.16), and 32 younger
adults, ages 18-23 years (M = 18.71, SD = 1.16) was utilized. All participants completed
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the Nelson Denny Vocabulary test, and older adults (M = 18.43, SD = 2.35) obtained
higher scores than younger adults (M = 12.41, SD = 2.86). The younger adult participants
attended James Madison University, and the older adults were enlisted through the
University of Colorado, Colorado Springs (UCCS) older adult participant pool, and from
Rockingham County in Virginia. Older adults were compensated monetarily ($10.00
cash) for participating and younger adults received class credit. In order to ensure that the
older adults were eligible to participate, they were given the Mini-Mental Status
Examination (MMSE). Only adults who showed no cognitive impairment, as indicated by
a score of 27 out of 30 or higher, were included in the experiment.
Materials
Cognitive assessments. The Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE) is a short
questionnaire used to determine levels of cognitive impairment in older adults. This test
has been used as a preliminary tool to detect cognitive deficits and is also used to track
impairment in patients diagnosed with disorders associated with cognitive deficits.
Patients obtaining a score of 27 out of 30 or higher are categorized as showing little to no
cognitive impairment. The MMSE contains 11 questions and only takes about 5 to 10
minutes to administer (see Appendix A). High reliability and validity have been found for
the MMSE as a test of cognitive functioning (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975).
The Brief Test of Adult Cognition (BTACT) is a battery of cognitive tests used to
assess levels of executive functioning in adults, and measures episodic verbal memory,
working memory span, verbal fluency, inductive reasoning, speed of processing, and task
switching (Tun & Lachman, 2005). The BTACT takes approximately 20 min to
administer, and can be given by telephone or in person. The BTACT is typically used
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with older adults and has been shown to be very reliable and to have high construct
validity (Tun & Lachman). This battery includes a word recall test, digits backward test,
category fluency test, stop and go task, number series test, and the 30 seconds and
counting task. Due to the possible relationship with false memory rates, the category
fluency test and number series test are the two tests of interest (see Appendix B). The
category fluency test is hypothesized to have a relationship with false memory rates
because it requires participants to generate related items for a given category;
presumably, larger semantic networks would create more associative priming for the
category label or the critical lure in the DRM. The number series test is also though to be
related to false memory rates because it requires participants to be able to recognize
patterns in order to correctly identify the next number in a list, which may indicate
greater ability in making connections between concepts.
The Nelson-Denny vocabulary test assesses verbal abilities. This test gives
participants a word and requires them to pick the closest meaning of the word from a
short list of multiple-choice answers (see Appendix C). There are 25 words on this list
and it takes about 5 min to administer.
Deese, Roediger, and McDermott (DRM) paradigm. The DRM Paradigm is a
list learning task used to induce and measure false memory rates, as shown through RK
responses. The task consists of a study phase, distractor task, and test phase. During the
study phase, participants are presented with lists containing semantically related words.
The items on each individual list converge on the “critical lure”, which is semantically
related to each word on its respective list (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995).
Participants are never presented with the critical lure during the study phase. After
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studying the words on the lists, participants are given a recognition task that includes not
only the previously studied items, but also the critical lures and unrelated filler items. For
each word on the recognition task participants are asked to judge if the word was old or
new. Old judgments for critical lures are categorized as a false memory. In the current
study 12 lists, each containing 12 words, were used for the study phase (See Appendix
D). To make the context, in this case font color, of the lists salient, three of the lists were
presented in red, three were presented in blue, three were presented in green, and three
were presented in yellow. Four counterbalanced versions of the lists were created, so that
each list was presented in a different color in each version. This was done to ensure that
correct color identification of items was not due to participants guessing a specific color
because of its possible relatedness to list items. The study phase was presented via
PowerPoint, while all responses were recorded on paper.
Procedure
After obtaining informed consent, older adult participants were screened for
cognitive impairment via the MMSE. Subjects that obtain scores below 27 out of 30 were
excluded from participating in the study, and instead, were given the Nelson Denny
Vocabulary test and then allowed to leave. Next, participants who obtained a score of 27
or higher received the BTACT, which lasted for approximately 20 min. Standard
procedure was followed for administering the BTACT. All younger adult participants
started the experiment with the BTACT. Next, the DRM paradigm was administered to
all participants.
For the DRM Paradigm, 144 words were shown on a PowerPoint presentation, for
about 10 min in duration. Each word appeared on the screen separately for 1 s, with a 500
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ms white screen between each word. The delay between each word list was
approximately 5 s. Each list was shown in either blue, green, red, or yellow font color
(i.e., three lists in blue font, three lists in green font, three lists in red font, and three lists
in yellow font) and all lists were presented in Times New Roman Font. Through
counterbalancing, 4 list versions were created, one of which was randomly assigned to
each participant. Participants were then given a colorblind test, which served as a filler
task, and confirmed that they were able to see the colors. After the filler task was
completed, participants received the recognition test packet, which consisted of 96 words;
48 of the words were previously studied items, 12 were critical lures, and 36 were
unrelated filler items, all presented in black, Times New Roman font. Participants were
instructed to judge if each word was old, meaning it was on the lists previously presented,
or new. If old was selected, participants were then asked if they were remembering,
knowing, or guessing that the word was old (see Appendix A). Finally, the subjects were
asked if the word was previously presented in blue, green, red, or yellow font.
Participants were also instructed not to flip back and forth between pages, and to answer
the questions for each word in order, without skipping any words or questions. Finally,
the participants were asked to complete the Nelson-Denny Vocabulary test, followed by a
demographic questionnaire. After completing all tasks, participants were debriefed about
the purpose of the study.
Results
After analyzing the data, it was realized that two of the lists, anger and cold, may
have been associated with certain colors, red and blue respectively. Despite the studied
items for these lists being presented in different colors (e.g., yellow, red, blue, and green)
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depending on the counterbalanced version, participants across versions were consistently
choosing the associated color for both studied items and critical lures (see Table 1). Due
to the association between the color and the item types, all studied items and critical lures
related to these lists were removed from the data set. The researcher believed that it was
necessary to use the corrected data because the original hypothesis aimed to see if the
specific contextual detail of color would increase R responses. In the case of the cold and
anger lists, a prior association may have been causing participants to recall these words at
a higher rate. By excluding the data for these lists, the researcher will be able to more
accurately report the results in conjunction with the hypotheses (i.e., that the association
between items and font color was happening at encoding). It is important to note that the
patterns of results for this study did not significantly change by removing these items. All
alpha levels are set at .05 unless otherwise noted. All effect sizes have been interpreted
using Cohen’s (1988) benchmarks.
Overall False Memory Effect. In order to see if there was an overall false
memory effect, a mixed 2 (between groups, age: younger, older) x 3 (repeated measures,
item type: studied, critical lure, filler) ANOVA was conducted on proportion of old
responses. Filler items were included to test for response bias. A main effect of item type
was found, F(2, 106) = 528.42, p < 0.01, such that both older and younger adults
categorized studied items (M = 0.68, SD = 0.14) and critical lures (M = 0.72, SD = 0.18)
as being old more frequently than filler items (M = 0.12, SD = 0.11; see Figure 1).
Follow up pairwise comparisons using LSD showed that critical lures were categorized as
old significantly more than fillers, p < .001, and that studied items were also categorized
as old significantly more than fillers, p < .001. Note that these effects were still
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significant even when applying the Bonferroni corrected alpha level of 0.017. The effect
size was calculated, η2 = 0.91, and showed that 91% of the variance of an old
categorization was explained by item type. There was, however, no effect of age, F(1, 53)
= .01, p = .93, showing that older and younger adults treated items the same. There also
was no interaction between item type and age, F(2, 106) = 1.84, p = .17, meaning that
regardless of item type, older and younger adults were responding similarly.
Item Type by Response Type. Next, the performance of older and younger
adults was compared using a 2 (between groups, age: younger, older) X 2 (repeated
measures, item type: studied, critical lure) X 2 (repeated measures, response type: R, K)
mixed ANOVA. There was a main effect of response type, F(1, 53) = 7.94, p < 0.01, η2 =
0.11, with R responses (M = 0.36, SD = 0.24) being utilized significantly more than K
responses (M = 0.22, SD = 0.21) across item type (studied and critical lure; see Figure 2).
There also was a significant interaction between response type and age, F(1, 53) = 8.49, p
< 0.01, η2 = 0.14, such that older adults used the R response (M = 0.42, SD = 0.24)
significantly more than younger adults (M = 0.30, SD = 0.22), and younger adults used
the K response (M = 0.30, SD = 0.23) significantly more than older adults (M = 0.14, SD
= 0.15; see Figure 3).
No main effects for item type (F(1, 53) = 1.95, p = .17) or age (F(1, 53) = .39, p =
.54) were found. There were no significant interactions between item type and age, F(1,
53) < 1, or between item type and response type, F(1, 53) < 1. Finally, there was no
interaction found between item type, judgment, type, and age, F(1, 53) = 2.66, p = 0.11,
showing that regardless of age, participants were responding similarly to the different
item types.
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Color Analyses. A 2 (between groups, age: younger, older) X 2 (repeated
measures, item type: studied, critical lure) X 3 (repeated measures, response type: R, K,
G) mixed ANOVA was conducted, comparing older and younger adults on the proportion
of correctly identified color responses. For critical lures, font color was deemed correct if
it was the color of the corresponding studied list. For this analysis, no significant results
were found, and performance for both age group was at or near floor (< 25%; see Table
2). No significant main effect of item type was found, F(1, 53) = 2.68, p > 0.05, such that
participants were getting the color correct for studied items (M = .27, SD = .24) at the
same rates as critical lures (M = .22, SD = .32). There also was no significant main effect
of age F(1, 53) = 2.13, p > 0.05, showing that older and younger adults did not differ in
the frequency of correctly identifying the color, regardless of item type. No interaction
between item type and age was found, F(1, 53) = 1.80, p > 0.05, such that older adults
got the color correct more frequently for critical lures than studied items, and younger
adults got the color correct more frequently for studied items than critical lures. There
was no main effect of response type, F(2, 106) = 1.07, p > 0.05, meaning that participants
did not get the color correct more for R, K, or G responses. Lastly, all other interactions
were not found to be significant, F(2, 106) < 1.
Correlation Analyses between False Memory Rates and BTACT. Finally,
older and younger adults’ rates of old responses for both studied items and critical lures
were examined via correlational analyses to determine their relationship with scores on
two BTACT tasks, the number series task (measures the ability to infer relationships
among items) and the category fluency (measures the ability to generate items in a
category). It was believed that both of these categories would have been correlated,
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though no directionality was assumed, with rates of false memory, as shown by old
responses to critical lures, because both may indicate more intricate semantic networks.
No significant correlations were found between these variables for older adults, though
most relationships were trending in a positive direction (see Table 3). Younger adults, in
comparison, were found to have a significant positive relationship between proportion of
K responses for critical lures and the number series task (R = .37, p < .05), indicating that
as participants K responses for critical lures increased, so did their scores on the number
series task (see Table 4).
Discussion
The current study aimed to explore 1) the role of a specific contextual detail (e.g.,
font color) in false memory and 2) any age-related difference in the encoding and binding
of this contextual detail. As seen by the aforementioned results, an overall false memory
effect did occur, meaning that participants did indeed have false memory (R or K
responses) for critical lures. These results are not surprising, as they are consistent with
many previously conducted experiments (Lampinen et al., 2005; McDermott & Roediger,
1998; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Although there were no significant differences
between studied items and critical lures, mathematically the means for proportion of
critical lures classified as old was higher than that of studied items. This indicates that
across age groups, participants were recognizing critical lures as old more frequently than
presented studied items. This result could be due to the participants internally generating
the critical lure repeatedly during the presentation of the lists. Seeing as how Deese
(1959), and Roediger and McDermott (1995) designed the words on each list to have a
backwards association with the critical lure, meaning that the words are ordered from
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most related to least related to the critical lure, it would make sense that the presentation
of the studied items would internally generate the critical lure, through spreading
activation, several times throughout the list presentation. This result is also consistent
with previous studies, in which critical lures not only had higher percentages of being
classified as old compared to studied items, but participants were also faster at identifying
them as old, as compared to studied items (Tun et al., 1998; Williamson et al., 2014). It is
interesting to note that Gutchess et al. (2007) reveal a tendency in older adults to rely on
contextual details, which results in an inability to reject stimuli, whether it is semantically
related or not. If this were true, then older adults should not be able to reject filler items,
and should have similar proportions of old responses for all item types. This, however,
was not the case, as seen by the fact that older adults categorized filler items as old
significantly less than critical lures and studied items.
Another noteworthy finding was the significant interaction between response type
and age, such that older adults were using “R” responses significantly more than younger
adults. Older adults also used “R” responses more than “K” responses. In contrast,
younger adults seemed to use these response types at a similar rate (see Figure 3). These
results are unexpected because many aging theories (e.g., ADH) would predict a higher
proportion of “K” responses in older adults, or the inability to make “R” responses and
incorporate contextual details. The fact that older adults used “R” responses so frequently
indicates an ability to encode contextual details and utilize them.
Despite results indicating that participants actually can have false memory for a
specific contextual detail, as indicated by high R responses, the hypothesis that R
responses would result in significantly more correct color identifications (i.e., identifying
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the critical lure as having been seen in the font color of the corresponding studied list)
was not supported, and both groups performed at or near floor for correctly identifying
colors. Many of the aforementioned results did shed light on the predictions of opposing
false memory theories, which will be explained in the context of the corresponding
research question.
The Role of Contextual Details in False Memory
Overall, the results show that it is possible for people, regardless of age, to bind
contextual details to items, though what exactly these details are has yet to be determined.
Due to older adults having significantly more R responses than younger adults, it can be
gleaned that in this case, they did have more false memory for contextual details, though
not for the specific detail of font color that was provided. FTT’s premises would suggest
that participants would have more K responses for critical lures, as opposed to R
responses, because the gist trace that was retrieved when viewing the word at test would
cause participants to feel as sense of familiarity with the word, but that gist trace would
not include contextual details (Brainerd, et al., 2001). It would also be expected that
participants would have classified critical lures as old significantly less than studied items
due to the ability to recollect to reject the lures; that is, relying on the verbatim memory
trace would lead them to correctly accept bed as a word they previously saw, but reject
sleep as being a word they previously saw. However, the current results contradict both
of these principles, as critical lures and studied items were classified as old at the same
rates and were both given more R responses in comparison with K responses, as seen
from the significant main effect of response type. Although FTT can explain the

26
existence of false K responses, it is unable to adequately explain false remembers, and the
ability to have false memory for contextual details.
In contrast to FFT (Brainerd et al., 2001), both source monitoring theory (Johnson
et al., 1993) and content borrowing (Lampinen et al., 2005) were not supported or refuted
from the results of this study. Both of these theories suggest that participants experience a
feeling of familiarity towards the critical lure during retrieval that can either result in an
R or K response. Due to the poor performance of both older and younger adults in tying
the given contextual detail of font color back to the studied items and critical lures, it
cannot be definitively determined if false remember formation is a product of encoding or
retrieval. If participants were able to tie the font color back to a specific list, then the
most reasonable explanation would be that they were encoding this specific detail and
binding it to both the studied items and critical lures at the time of study, as this is a very
difficult task. If this were the case, then it would provide strong support for the encoding
hypothesis. The current results do not rule out the possibility of false remember formation
at retrieval, but they also do not conclusively oppose the encoding hypothesis. The task
may have simply been too difficult, as is evidenced by the floor effect for correct color
identification. More research is needed in order to tease apart whether this is an issue of
encoding or retrieval.
Age Related Differences in Encoding and Binding of a Specific Contextual Detail
Overall, it was found that older and younger adults were not able to bind the
contextual detail of font color to any item type, as both groups performed at near chance.
One age-related difference that was found, however, was an interaction between age and
response type, such that older adults more frequently used R responses compared to
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younger adults. This finding is interesting, because perhaps the contextual details actually
are helping older adults to remember information. These findings will now be discussed
in terms of the aforementioned aging theories.
As previously stated, ADH predicts that older adults have an inability to bind
contextual details to relevant contexts (Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2000; 2007). If this theory
were correct, then it could be predicted that older adults will have increased K responses
caused by an overwhelming sense of familiarity. However, all items would seem familiar
in this case, because of the inability to tie the contextual details to the content. Older
adults were shown to have more false remembers than younger adults, indicating that
they can have false memory for contextual details, though which details are still
unknown. The results of this study do not support the prediction of ADH, showing that
this theory cannot adequately explain the occurrence of false memory for contextual
details in older adults.
In contrast to ADH, hyper-binding suggests that older adults cannot filter out
irrelevant information, and instead will over-bind information together (Campbell et al.,
2010). If this theory is correct, then older adults would have increased R responses for
critical lures compared to younger adults. This was found in the current study, supporting
hyper-binding. The theory would also predict that older adults would be worse than
younger adults at tying the correct color to items due to the increased interference from
irrelevant information; however, due to the floor effect of color responses, the current
study can not shed light on any age-related differences regarding the accuracy of
contextual binding.
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The encoding hypothesis (Fogler, 2011) also cannot be ruled out, seeing as how
both age groups are displaying false memory for contextual details. This hypothesis
cannot be fully supported because participants were not able to tie the font color back to
the studied items or critical lure, though this may have been because of the task difficulty.
Though the results of this study did show that older adults can have false memory for
contextual details as shown through false remember responses, it is still unclear if false
remembers are a product of an encoding or retrieval error.
Limitations and Future Directions
One major limitation of this study was the semantic association between two of
the lists (anger and cold), with font colors used. This limitation, however, was remedied,
and the data was reported appropriately. Another limitation was that many participants
did not realize that the words were being presented in color. It could be that this specific
type of contextual detail was not made salient enough, causing the floor effect that was
observed. In order to create a stronger manipulation, brightness and salience of the font
color could be manipulated, or other types of contextual details could be utilized. Finally,
the currently study was unable to determine if the contextual details increased false R
responses for participants, specifically older adults. A follow up study will incorporate
another condition, in which participants view the studied lists in black font, as opposed to
colored font. This condition will be used as a control group. Then, researchers will be
able to compare the false remember rates of participants in the contextually salient
condition with those in the control condition. If participants in the salient condition do
experience increased false remembers, compared to participants in the control condition,
then it would be probable that this is due to the salience of the contextual details. By
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adding this condition, researchers will be able to further test the possibility that the
contextual detail is increasing false remember responses and that this may have a
differential impact on older adult rates, as potentially seen by the significantly higher R
responses rates for older versus younger adults
Conclusion
Overall, it was found that older adults can have false remember responses for
contextual details, though their accuracy in applying a specific contextual detail was
poor. Older adults were shown to make more false remember responses compared to
younger adults, which indicates that they are able to encode and associate contextual
details to studied items and critical lures. The results of this study do tell us that both
older and younger adults are using contextual information, however because there was a
floor effect for font color, we still cannot say if this is happening at encoding or retrieval.
The results of this study do not rule out any previous theories, and still support the further
exploration of the encoding hypothesis in attempts to tease apart whether this is an issue
of encoding or retrieval.
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Table 1
Proportion of Associated Color Judgment by Test Versions (i.e., anger reported in
red; cold reported in blue)
Item
Version 1
Version 2
Version 3
Version 4
Anger

0.60

0.20

0.43

0.33

Cold

0.40

0.53

0.50

0.75

Note. In version 1, anger was actually presented in red. It was presented in green, yellow, or blue in
the other versions, respectively. In version 2, cold was actually presented in blue, and was presented in
red, green, or yellow in the other versions.
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Table 2
Mean Proportions for Color Correct by Age, Item Type, and Response Type
Age
Studied
Studied
Studied
CL “R”
CL “K”
CL “G”
Category
“R”
“K”
“G”
Older
Adults

0.24
(.17)

0.20
(.19)

0.24
(.27)

0.24
(.22)

0.20
(.36)

0.20
(.31)

Younger
Adults

0.40
(.26)

0.32
(.17)

0.25
(.31)

0.25
(.33)

0.22
(.26)

0.23
(.40)
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Table 3
Correlations between Item types, Response Types, and BTACT Subscales for Older Adults
Item Type by
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Response
____
1. Studied “R”
2. CL “R”

.90**

____

3. Studied “K”

-.21

-.15

____

4. CL “K”

-.31

-.32

.62**

____

5. Category
Fluency

.22

.23

.18

.32

____

6. Number Series

.41

.33

-.08

.04

.25

*Significant at p < .05.
**Significant at p < .01.

6.

____
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Table 4
Correlations between Item types, Response Types, and BTACT Subscales for Younger Adults
Item Type by
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Response
____
1. Studied “R”
2. CL “R”

.83**

____

3. Studied “K”

-.75**

-.60**

____

4. CL “K”

-.63**

-.71**

.73**

____

5. Category
Fluency

-.18

-.16

.22

.22

____

6. Number Series

-.14

-.12

.30

.37*

.06

*Significant at p < .05.
**Significant at p < .01.

6.

____
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Proportion of Items Classifed as "Old"

Overall False Memory Effect for Older and
Younger Adults
1
0.9
0.8

0.7
0.6
0.5

Older Adults

0.4

Younger Adults

0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Studied

Critical Lure

Filler

Item Type

Figure 1. Proportions of items classified as “Old” by age. The error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals.
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Proportions of Item Types Classified by
Response Types
Proportions of Item Type by Judgment

1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5

Older Adults

0.4

Younger Adults

0.3
0.2
0.1
0
"R" Studied

"K" Studied

"R" CL

"K" CL

Item Type by Response Type
Figure 2. The proportions of items by response types made by old older and younger
adults. The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Interaction of Age and Response Type
1

Proportion of Responses

0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5

Older Adults

0.4

Younger Adults

0.3
0.2
0.1

0
Remember

Know

Response Type
Figure 3. The interaction of age category and response type as shown through the
proportions of items categorized as remember versus know for older and younger adults.
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Appendix A

The Mini-Mental State Exam

38
Appendix B

Subsections of the MIDUS II Cognitive Test Battery
Test of Adult Cognition

Brief

CATEGORY FLUENCY (1.5 minutes) Drachman & Leavitt (1972)
Now I am going to name a category and you will name things that belong in that
category. Let’s practice with the category “fruit”. You could say peach, or pear. Can you
think of any other fruits? (wait for 2 correct items). In a moment I will give you another
category. When I say begin, you will name all the things from this new category you can
think of, as fast as you can. You will have one minute to do this. I will let you know
when your time is up. The new category is not included here. Do you have any questions?
Ready?
Begin. (Time for one minute). If person stops before 1 minute is up, say “There’s still
more time, can you think of any more?”
Good, now let’s go on.
NUMBER SERIES (2.5 minutes) Salthouse & Prill (1987)
In the next exercise I will read you a series of numbers that may get larger or smaller in
value. At the end you will try to figure out what the next number would be. So if the
numbers were 2,4,6,8,10, the next number would be 12. After I say each number I will
pause for as long as you need, and then you should say “okay” when you are ready for
me to go on to the next number in the group. So if I said 2, you should say “okay” when
you are ready for me to go on to the next number, then I say 4, you say okay, 6, okay, 8,
okay, 10, and at the end I will ask you what you think the next number would be. In this
case the next number would be 12, as each number has increased by 2.
Let’s try one for practice: 35 (okay), 30 (okay), 25 (okay), 20 (okay), 15 (okay) AND the
next number would be....???? (The answer should be 10 as each number has decreased by
5). There will be different patterns, and some of these will be harder than others, so just
do the best you can. If you are not sure of the answer, it is okay to guess. Do you have
any questions? (Pause after each of the first 4 items for okay response; after the last item,
say AND the next number is...?).

39
Appendix C
Nelson Denny Vocabulary Test
We are interested in your knowledge of the meanings of words. Please complete each of
the following items with the alternative that best fits the sentence. For example, consider
the following:
A linguist is trained in
a. art

b. law

c. language

d. writing

e. history

You should have chosen “c” above. There are 25 more items for you to work on. Begin
when you are ready.
1. Fundamental reasons are:
a. Logical
b. Basic
c. Acceptable
d. Convenient
e. Hidden
2. A cluster is a
a. Clue
b. Mess
c. Badge
d. Group
e. Team
3. A valid reason is
a. New
b. Critical
c. False
d. Hopeful
e. Sound
4. To insinuate is to
a. Devise
b. Err
c. Convict
d. Hint
e. Officiate
5. An arrogant person is
a. Haughty
b. Wealthy

c. Subdued
d. Unsuccessful
e. Arrested
6. A medieval crusade was a
a. Campaign
b. Battalion
c. Parade
d. Trip
e. Cruise
7. An indictment is a
a. Charge
b. Statute
c. Commission
d. Warning
e. Proclamation
8. A prudent move is
a. Wise
b. Kind
c. Rash
d. Costly
e. Successful
9. A spontaneous reply is
a. Erroneous
b. Unconsidered
c. Fierce
d. Provoking
e. Embarrassing
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10. Current fashions are
a. Prevalent
b. Changing
c. Anticipated
d. Unpopular
e. Outdated
11. Inveterate hatred is
a. Unmerited
b. Deep-rooted
c. Inherited
d. Nationalistic
e. Legalistic
12. A sham battle is
a. Bloody
b. Make-believe
c. Short
d. Indecisive
e. Poorly planned
13. Infinitesimal objects are
a. Awkward
b. Ponderous
c. Disagreeable
d. Everlasting
e. Very small
14. One who is amenable is
a. Irresponsible
b. Submissive
c. Unruly
d. Saucy
e. Envious
15. An ominous cloud is
a. High
b. Fleecy
c. Black
d. Threatening
e. Stationary
16. To revile is to
a. Gloat
b. Frolic

c. Infect
d. Beweep
e. Slander
17. An insolent person is
a. Scheming
b. Bankrupt
c. Haughty
d. Dishonest
e. Heedless
18. To enhance is to
a. Protect
b. Enter
c. Capture
d. Enlarge
e. Pursue
19. An igneous appearance is
a. Ugly
b. Beautiful
c. Hopeful
d. Unworthy
e. Firelike
20. A prelate is high in the
a. Navy
b. Church
c. Drama
d. Government
e. Lodge
21. To decoy is to
a. Estrange
b. Tease
c. Entice
d. Defy
e. Bluff
22. A lanuginous substance is
a. Hard
b. Sticky
c. Downy
d. Long
e. Slow-moving
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23. A myriad group is
a. Innumerable
b. Misguided
c. Angry
d. Treacherous
e. Merry
24. An adze is used by a
a. Teacher
b. Carpenter
c. Musician
d. Decorator
e. Mathematician

25. A scurrilous attack is
a. Hurried
b. Feeble
c. Desperate
d. Abusive
e. Inoffensive
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Appendix D
DRM Word Lists
ANGER
mad
fear
hate
rage
temper
fury
ire
wrath
happy
fight
hatred
mean

CHAIR
table
sit
legs
seat
couch
desk
recliner
sofa
wood
cushion
swivel
stool

COLD
hot
snow
warm
winter
ice
wet
frigid
chilly
heat
weather
freeze
air

DOCTOR
nurse
sick
lawyer
medicine
health
hospital
dentist
physician
ill
patient
office
stethoscope

FOOT
shoe
hand
toe
kick
sandals
soccer
yard
walk
ankle
arm
boot
inch

FRUIT
apple
vegetable
orange
kiwi
citrus
ripe
pear
banana
berry
cherry
basket
juice

NEEDLE
thread
pin
eye
sewing
sharp
point
prick
thimble
haystack
thorn
hurt
injection

SLEEP
bed
rest
awake
tired
dream
wake
snooze
blanket
doze
slumber
snore
nap

SLOW
fast
lethargic
stop
listless
snail
cautious
delay
traffic
turtle
hesitant
speed
quick

SPIDER
web
insect
bug
fright
fly
arachnid
crawl
tarantula
poison
bite
creepy
animal

SWEET
sour
candy
sugar
bitter
good
taste
tooth
nice
honey
soda
chocolate
heart

WINDOW
door
glass
pane
shade
ledge
sill
house
open
curtain
frame
view
breeze
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Recognition Test Instructions
On the following recognition test, you will find some words that you have studied, and
some words that you have not studied. You are to make three decisions about these
words.
First, for each word, decide if it is Old – meaning it was one of the words you studied; or
it is New – meaning it was not one of the words you studied.
Second, if you selected Old, you are to decide if the you are Remembering, Knowing,
or Guessing. Although these decisions sound similar, their meanings are quite distinct.
Here is what they mean:
Remembering: You have a conscious recollection of what happened or what was
experienced at the time the word was presented. You can recall details like: how
the word looked, what words preceded or followed, what you were doing or
thinking, or what was going on in the room when the word was presented.
Knowing: You recognize the word as being part of the list but cannot vividly
recollect anything about its actual occurrence or what happened at the time it was
presented. The word does not evoke any specific conscious recollection but you
are certain you recognize the word.
Guessing: You have no recollection whether the word was on the studied list or
not, and you are just making a guess.
Please use these definitions as you make your decisions.
Lastly, if you selected Old, you are to decide what color font the word was presented in.
Red, Yellow, Green, or Blue
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